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ABSTRACT
The Attribution of Freedom by Oneself and an Observer

Robert G. Bringle, B.A., Hanover College
M.S., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Dr. Ivan D. Steiner

This research was designed to evaluate the impact of behavioral

consistency on an actor's and observer's attribution of freedom.
sistency was defined in terms of

(a)

Con-

the frequency, and constancy of

magnitude, of reinforcing behavior ostensibly emitted by the actor and
(b)

the constancy of the entity that was reinforced.

Attributed

decision freedom, attributed outcome freedom, and constraints were
examined, and it was predicted that manipulated consistency would have

similar effects on the attributions of observers and participants.

The data provided little evidence that behavioral consistency

affected attributed freedom.

Examination of the results suggests that

outneither participants nor observers believed the actor had very much

come freedom.

Support is found for the contention that observation of

behavior can affect inferences such as beliefs and attitudes.
consistency affected
It is clear from the research that behavioral
their attributions to
subjects' evaluations of observed behaviors, and
the participants who produced them.

Furthermore, manipulated consis-

on observer and partitency sometimes had markedly different effects

cipant.

process that can result
The findings suggest that at least one

observer is the availability,
in divergent inferences between actor and
about what he expected or tried
usually only to the actor, of information
to do.

are discussed.
Theoretical implications of the results
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The Attribution of Freedom by Oneself
and an Observer"^

Robert Gordon Bringle

University of Massachusetts

Much of the literature on attribution (e.g., Ajzen, 1971;

Bern,

1965, 1967; Jones, Davis and Gergen, 1961; Jones and Harris, 1967;

Kelley, 1967, 1971; Steiner, 1971) has implicitly and explicitly

suggested that inferences concerning another person, based upon observing his behavior or obtaining information about the nature of the

behavior in which he has

ostensibly engaged, depend in part upon the

subject's perception of how free the person was to engage in the
behavior.

However, the relevance of the attribution of freedom extends

beyond the attribution process, £er

se_.

Reactance theory research

(e.g., Brehm, 1966) and dissonance phenomena (e.g., Brehm and Cohen,

crucial.
1962) are but a few examples in which the role of freedom is

The theoretical and empirical work of Steiner and his associates
Davidson and
(e.g., Ajzen, 1971; Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973;
both the
Steiner, 1971; Kauffman, 1971; Steiner, 1971) has considered
to another.
antecedants and consequences of the attribution of freedom

between freedom and
This literature begins to probe the relationship
obtain knowledge
the questions, "How do we perceive other people,

information have on our
about them, and what consequences does this

interactions with them?"
in attributions to a
One example involves the role of freedom

reinforcing agent.

reactions
Steiner (1971) has suggested that people's

to the rewards and punishments they receive depend, in part, upon the

amount of freedom they attribute to the agent who administers them.
Recent research (Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973; Davidson and
Steiner, 1971) has investigated the kinds of cues on which recipients
of payoffs may base their judgments about an agent's freedom.

This

research suggests that the predictability of the reinforcements (across
occasions) helps determine the degree to which the reinforcing agent
is seen as free.

Specifically, as the administration of reinforcements

becomes less predictable, the agent is perceived by others as being

more free in determining the nature of his reinforcing behavior.

A related but separate question focuses on the problem:
does an individual see himself?

How free

It may or may not be true that the

attribution of freedom to oneself depends upon the same cues or anLecedants as does the attribution of freedom to another.

pose of this research to investigate this problem:

It is the pur-

Attributions of

freedom to oneself.

Current Theoretical Formulations
Jones and Nisbett (1971) have suggested that attributions by another

and attributions to oneself differ in both content and process.

major thesis is that,

"...

Their

there is a persuasive tendency for actors

obto attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas

disposiservers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal

tions" (Jones and Nisbett, 1971, p. 2).

They contend that for an

situation;"
observer, "behavior is figural against the ground of the
and behavior is
while for the actor, "situational cues are figural"

perceived as a response to the situation (Jones and Nisbett, 1971,
p.

15).

While the question of freedom was not directly confronted,

this analysis and other research (e.g.. Feather and Simon, 1971; Jones

and Harris, 1967; McArthur, 1970; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant and Marecek,
1973; Storms, 1973) suggest that the attribution of freedom to oneself

may not parallel attributions of freedom by another.
As support for the proposition that the attributions by oneself

and another tend to diverge, Nisbett

studies which display the effect.

et_ al^.

(1973) report several

However, they point out that the

mere accumulation of demonstrations of the phenomenon is of superficial
significance.

What is necessary are studies which test the mechanisms

underlying the proposition.

Storms (1973) presents data which strongly

suggest that the perceptual orientations are at least partially responsible for the divergence in attributions by oneself and by an observer.

Storms arranged the experimental situation in such a way as to allow

both actors and observers to again view the actor's behavior from
either the same or a different visual orientation (this was accomplished

with the use of video tape recordings of the behavior).

When actors

and observers viewed the behavior from the same orientations, he found

situational
that actors attributed their behavior relatively more to

causes than did observers.

But when a visual reorientation was in-

observers
stituted, the attributional differences between actors and

were exactly reversed.^

Actors who viewed themselves attributed their

observers.
behaviors relatively less to situational causes than did

concerned
While none of the previous research has specifically

Wolosin and Denner
itself with the attribution of freedom, a study by

(1971) reports data which suggest that people do in fact attribute more

freedom to themselves than to others under similar conditions.

Some of

the data from the Wolosin and Denner study suggest that the consequences
of the behavior (social desirability) have an influence on the attribu-

tion of freedom.

The study investigated actions which could have been

perceived by the subjects as socially desirable in nature.

The only

action which could be construed as socially undesirable ("running out"
on a person in trouble) did not result in the attribution of greater

freedom to self.

Actually, it resulted in an increase in the freedom

being attributed to others.

This ex post facto finding suggests that

the attribution of freedom to oneself (and/or another) may be sensitive
to evaluative factors in the situations, or may be used by the subject

for purposes of self-enhancement, dcfensiveness

,

justification, etc.

Bem (1965, 1967, 1968, 1972) has presented an analysis of the
attribution process which apparently contrasts with that of Jones and
Nisbett.

Bem contends that the socialization process necessarily

teaches us to use overt cues as the basis for self-descriptive statements.

Thus, a person can be regarded as an observer of his own

behavior (especially when internal states are vague or ambiguous)

,

and

inferences (beliefs and attitude statements) are made from these

observations and the circumstantial context within which they occur.

Bem argues that self-perception and interpersonal perception are similar
with regard to process and with regard to certain sources of evidence
(i.e., overt behavior and its apparent controlling variables).

Research on the forced compliance situation by Calder, Ross and
Insko (1973) is one example of support for the Bem proposition.

Their
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observers watched a participating subject perform a dull task and insincere behavior.

They found that the observer's estimates of the parti-

cipating subject's attitudes paralleled the participant's actual attitudes to a "remarkable extent."
Bern

(1972), however, identifies at least four factors which can

result in divergent perceptions by oneself and an observer:
(1)

Internal stimuli;

(2)

knowledge of past behavior;

(3)

defensive-

ness, or self-esteem maintenance, and (4) perceptual differences for

actors and observers (as cited, for example, by Jones and Nisbett)
It was previously mentioned that the analysis by Jones and Nisbett

and the analysis by

process.

Bern

were contrasting approaches to the attribution

However, it is possible to demonstrate that they differ sub-

stantially on only one point:
ones of emphasis.

Process.

Other differences are only

If one were to eliminate from the Jones and Nisbett

analysis their contention that attributions by oneself and by an observer involve different processes, the two positions would be amenable.
Actually, such an omission would not seriously jeopardize their contri-

bution for two reasons:

(1)

Their presentation and support for the

contention that there are two processes is extremely weak, and
(2)

their conclusions are not contingent upon two processes being

different since all of their derivations can be supported by invoking

differential information, and by positing that different aspects of the
environment assume figure and ground roles for the actor and the
observer.

•

Ignoring the question of process in the Jones and Nisbett analysis
allows it to assume a role which complements Bern's analysis.

Specifically,

Bern

states that we are observers of our own behavior, while Jones and

Nisbett suggest certain perceptual variables which may be relevant to
the manner in which we (as actors and as observers) make such observations.

This compatibility between the two formulations, which occurs

because

Bern

predicts divergent attributions under certain conditions, is

especially evident in Bern's latest statement

(Bern,

1972, p. 42).

Nisbett and Valins (1971) review some of the empirical evidence
for the self-perception process suggested by

Bern

Schachter, 1962, 1964; Valins, 1966, 1973).

Nisbett and Valins con-

and others (e.g.,

clude that, "People appear to infer their beliefs and feelings from

observations both of their own overt behavior and their own autonomic

behavior"

(p.

15).

These authors also suggest that these inferences

take the form of hypotheses which the individual tries to confirm.

They contend that the causal origin of the behavior is crucial and
will, in part, determine the likelihood that an inference will be made

by the person.
Nisbett and Valins state that there are four elements which interact and influence the inferences we make:
causes,

(3)

(1)

the behavior,

(2)

its

its consequences, and (4) feelings about the object toward

which the behavior was directed.

Presumably these should also be

crucial variables in analyzing the attribution of freedom to oneself.
So far, the review of theoretical positions suggests that the

attribution of freedom to oneself will behave similarly to the attribution of freedom by another only under rather limited conditions.

Theoretically, if the sources of divergence identified by

Bern

were

by Nisbett
minimized or eliminated, and if the four factors identified

7

and Valins were, held constant, then attributions by oneself and by an

observer should be similar or equivalent.

But, if these conditions are

not satisfied, it is possible that attributions to oneself and by an

observer will diverge, and the antecedant conditions for the attribution
of freedom by oneself will differ from those suggested by previous

research on the attribution of freedom by an observer.

One aim of the

present research will be to evaluate how some of these parameters affect
the attribution of freedom by oneself and by an observer.

Hypotheses
Steiner defines perceived decision freedom as the,

.

.

volition

the individual believes himself to exercise" (Steiner, 1971, p. 194).

Br ingle, Lehtinen and Steiner (1973) and Davidson and Steiner (1971)

have shown that predictability of behavior is crucial to the attribution
of decision freedom to another.

Predictability has been successfully

manipulated by varying the frequency of reinforcements (Bringle,
Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973; Davidson and Steiner, 1971) and by varying
the magnitude of reinforcements (Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner,

Experiment I, 1973).

It is plausible that frequency of reinforcement

may have similar effects on the attribution of decision freedom to oneself.

That is, a person who observes himself behaving in a highly

predictable (consistent) manner is more likely to perceive himself as
constrained and, therefore, lacking decision freedom; whereas, a person

whose behavior varies considerably and is relatively unpredictable is
more likely to attribute decision freedom to himself.

Hypothesis 1 - Subjects who observe themselves emitting highly

consistent (i.e., 90% frequency, rewards and punishments of constant
magnitude) responses (High Consistency condition) will attribute less

decision freedom to themiselves than will subjects who observe themselves
emitting relatively inconsistent (i.e., 50% frequency of reinforcement,
rewards and punishments of varied magnitude) responses (Low Consistency
condition).

An observer viewing the subject's behavior under either of

these conditions will make similar attributions to the subject.

(See

Appendix I for the schedules of reinforcement.)
Actually, the above manipulation of consistency is, in essence,
a manipulation of consistency across occasions since the condition of

50% varied reinforcement (in contrast to the 90%, constant reinforcement)

represents variation in nature and frequency of the behavior on different occasions.

However, frequency and magnitude of reinforcement are

not the only ways to vary consistency across occasions.

Steiner

(unpublished), working from Kelley's (1967) analysis of attribution,

has suggested that predictability may also depend upon what the individual reinforces as he moves from one occasion to another.

Thus, for any

given frequency of reinforcement, if a person shows variations in what
least
he reinforces from one occasion to another, it is likely that (at
as
initially) he will perceive himself (and be perceived by others)

all
more free than a person who always reinforces the same entity on

occasions.

Hypothesis

2 -

Subjects who display highly predictable behavior in

same entity (entity A)
the sense that they reward the presence of the
all occasions (90% A
and punish its absence consistently across nearly
to themselves than will
condition) will attribute less decision freedom
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subjects who obseirve themselves rewarding and punishing two different
entities (entities A and B) across occasions (A

& B

condition)

.

Sub-

jects who observe themselves initially endorsing one entity, and then
find themselves endorsing the other entity (B"*"A condition) will attribute
an intermediate amount of decision freedom to themselves.

An observer

viewing the subject's behavior under these conditions should make similar attributions to the subject.

Steiner (1971) has defined outcome freedom as including,

"...

the

availability and desirability of the outcomes a [person] wishes to
obtain"

(p.

194).

Whereas the perception of decision freedom is hypoth-

esized to be contingent upon the predictability of behaviors, outcome

freedom should vary as the

frequency of the reinforcing behavior varies.

This assumes that subjects view the production of reinforcements as

desirable.

It seems plausible that subjects will regard reinforcing

behavior as desirable because the experimenter

V7ill

have explained that

his purpose in conducting the experiment is to study such acts.

Thus,

it appears that most of the normative factors operating in the experi-

mental situation will lead to the perception on the part of the subject
and observer that producing reinforcements is desirable.

Hypothesis

3 -

Subjects who observe themselves emitting a high

frequency of reinforcements (High Consistency condition) will attribute

greater outcome freedom to themselves than will subjects who observe

themselves emitting relatively infrequent reinforcements (Low Consistency
condition).

An observer viewing the subject's behavior under either of

these conditions will make similar attributions to the subject.
Valins and
Research from the self perception framework (Schachter,
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Bern)

suggests that people infer their beliefs from observations of their

own behavior.

However, it also contends that such inferences are con-

tingent upon the person seeing himself as the causal origin of the

behavior.

Thus, it follows that those subjects who see themselves as

being the cause of various patterns of reinforcements in the experiment
will assume that their behavior is indicative of their beliefs concerning the experimental task.

Hypothesis

4 -

Subjects who observe themselves almost always en-

dorsing a specific entity (90% A condition) will Indicate that that
entity is correct with greater certainty than will subjects who endorse
each of two entities with equal frequency, but with random ordering
(A & B condition).

Those subjects who observe themselves endorsing an

entity initially, and then switch and begin endorsing the second entity

will assume an intermediate position with regard to their certainty as
to which entity is correct.

Subjects who see themselves endorsing

positions with high frequency (High Consistency condition) will indicate
greater confidence with regard to which position they feel is correct
than will subjects who observe themselves endorsing positions with

relatively low frequency (Low Consistency condition).

An observer

viewing the subject's behavior under these conditions should make
similar attributions to the subject.
Bern

contends that attributions by oneself and by an observer will

be similar under the proper conditions.

All of the above hypotheses

similar since
state that attributions by oneself and an observer will be
the effect of the
the experimental situation will minimize or eliminate

four factors mentioned by

Bern (i.e.,

internal stimuli, knowledge of
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past behavior, self-esteem maintenance, and perceptual differences),
and since the visual orientation to the behavior will be very similar
for the actor and the observer.

However, it should be pointed out that

these predictions are in direct contrast to those made by Jones and

Nisbett.

The latter authors are very explicit in their claim that a

person will attribute external causation to his own behavior, while an
observer will attribute internal causation to the same behavior.

It

should be noted that the present experiment will provide a test of the
issue.

METHOD

One Viundred and eighty subjects reported in pairs to the laboratory

under the assumption that the experiment dealt with "learning and rein-

forcement." One of the subjects (selected randomly from the pair and

hereafter called participant) filled out a scale designed to measure
internal-external propensities (MacDonald and Tseng, unpublished).

The

second subject (hereafter called observer) filled out the same scale
as he felt the participant would respond.

(Every effort was made to

insure that the two subjects in an experimental session were not well

acquainted.

The initial phase of the experiment ostensibly conditioned a covert
thumb muscle response in each hand of the participant.

The participant

was told (See Appendix II for complete instructions)

You will be exposed to an escape-avoidance task which will
be used to condition a thumb response in each of your hands.
You will wear a set of earphones through which will be played
In addition, a noise will occasionally interrupt the
music.
music. You can turn off or delay the onset of the noise by
making the appropriate response.
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The appropriate response which the electromyograph will be
recording, and the only response, is a small muscle twitch which
is too small to be perceived by you.
Please note that you can
not evoke the correct response by actively moving your thumbs
since this response is too big to register on the electrom^'ograph
and is filtered out.
During the conditioning, when the noise comes on, if a
small thumb twitch of the proper size occurs, the noise will be
turned off for the remainder of a five-second interval. Also,
if the noise is off and you make the thumb twitch, you v/ill postpone or avoid the onset of the noise for five seconds. In
addition, the appropriate response for the intervals will alternate
from left to right hand.

The subjects were seated in chairs facing the video monitor and

display board (See figure 1 for details of the room arrangement) while
the conditioning trials were administered.

The bogus conditioning phase

lasted for 11 minutes during which time the participant and observer

heard through earphones the tape of music which was interrupted by
noise at a decreasing rate.

Tlie

participant

vjas

concerning the effectiveness of the conditioning:

then given feedback
"The conditioning of

the two thumb responses is very strong and you have good control of the

responses in each of your hands."

He was then told that the rest of

the experiment dealt with reinforcements and learning, and that the two

conditioned responses would be used in the rewarding and punishing
process.

The participant was told:
The subsequent part of the experiment investigates the
reinforcing behavior of individuals. You will be shown a video
tape of an experimental session filmed last semester. The tape
shows a person who is working on a perceptual discrimination
task which I will explain. The person was shown pairs of lines
which differed in length by a small amount; it was his task to
judge which of the two lines was the longer. As the experiment
progressed, the difference between the lengths of the lines slowly
became greater. The experimenter was interested in determining
at v;hich point the subject would be able to reliably determine

13

Figure

1

Layout of Experimental Laboratory

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

H.

Table where pre- and post-experimental questionnaires were
administered.
Observer's seat during experimental session.
Participant's seat during experimental session (reclining chair).
Table containing video monitor and display panel.
Electrode leads and earphones.
One-way observation mirror.
Table containing video tape recorder, audio tape recorder,
timer and power supply.
Electromyograph.
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which line was the longer of the two. The experiment ended when
the subject was able to give six correct answers.
The particular
subject whose performance you will be watching was able to complete the experiment in just under the 50 trial average. You
are going to be shown, however, only a portion of those trials
the first twenty trials.
Although the person was not given the following information, we are going to tell you that the longer line was always
in the same position on the card.
That is, the longer line v/as
always either on the left side or on the right side. Thus,
although you don't know at this time in which position the longer
line was, you do know it was always in the same position.
Following each response by the person on the tape, the
center light on this display panel will come on for 10 seconds.
Any thumb responses you produce during this 10 second period
will be recorded on the dials of the panel. The counters on the
panel will represent the total amount of reinforcements to the
person on the tape. Each response emitted by the right hand
will constitute a reward and will represent adding five cents
to the total.
The rewards will be shown on the top counters.
Any response emitted by the left hand will constitute a punishment and will represent deducting five cents from the total. The
punishments will be shown on the bottom counters. The money
represented by your responses is symbolic and will represent
what you would have given the person for his performance had he
actually been doing the task as part of the present experiment.

—

•

The perceptual discrimination task consisted of pairs of lines
(with the left hand line labeled "A", and the right hand line labeled
"B") which varied in length and width from one card to another, but were

always of equal length and width on the same card.

The accomplice

who assumed the role of subject on the video tape responded to the
stimuli in a random fashion such that 50% of his responses were "A"
and 50% "B".

This manner of responding, and the fact that the person

before
on the tape was alleged to have taken just less than 50 trials
observer
he gave six correct answers, insured that the participant and
was
would have no basis for suspecting which of the two positions

always correct.
tape of
Following the explanation of the procedure, the video
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experimental session was sho\m, and the reward and punishment responses

ostensibly produced by the participant were displayed after each trial.

The procedure of leading the participant to assume that the two covert
responses had been conditioned allowed one to display any distribution
of responses one wished, and, yet, have the subject assume that he had

emitted them.

It also minimized the internal stimuli associated with

the participant's behavior and the prior experience associated with
The responses that the participant would attribute to

the behavior.

himself could now be manipulated, and the antecedants and consequences
of the attributions that resulted from his observation of the behavior

which was ostensibly his could be investigated.
After viewing the video tape the participant was told that in order
to verify the amount of control that he had exercised over the responses,

and to check for improvement during the reinforcement phase, a short

session of escape-avoidance trials would be administered.

On the four-

minute escape-avoidance tape the participant and observer again heard

music with some, but few, interruptions by noise.

The participant was

then given verbal feedback indicating that he still had good control of

both responses.

A questionnaire was then administered to the participant which, in
addition

to

providing manipulation checks, measured the amount of

decision freedom and outcome freedom attributed by the participant to

himself and the nature of the constraints that he felt had influenced
his behavior.

A questionnaire was administered to the observer on

items.
which he reported his attributions to the participant on similar

(See Appendix III for questionnaires.)
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Manipulations
Each pair of subjects underwent one of two conditions designed to

manipulate predictability of the reinforcements by way of frequency of
reinforcements and magnitude of reinforcements.

(In this experiment

either rewards or punishments might follow a trial, never both.)

The

subjects were told that each reward and punishment represented five
cents.

(See Appendix I for the schedules of reinforcement.)

High Consistency condition - The counters indicated that the

(1)

participant rewarded 45% of the trials

with six reward responses

(9 trials)

each, and punished 45% of the trials (9 trials) with three punish responThis constitutes 90% reinforcement, with constant magnitude

ses each.

of reward and punishment, and net reward of $1.35.

Low Consistency condition - The counters indicated that the

(2)

participant rewarded 25% of the trials

(5

trials) with 9, 9, 11, 12, and

13 reward responses each, and punished 25% of the trials (5 trials) with
4, 5, 5, 6,

and

7

punish responses each.

This constitutes 50% reinforce-

with varied magnitude of reward and punishment, and a net reward

ment,

of $1.35.

Each pair of subjects also underwent one of three conditions designed to manipulate predictability of reinforcements with regard to

consistency across occasions by way of the entity that was endorsed.
(1)

90% A condition - The reinforcements were distributed among

the trials in such a way as to Indicate that the participant was endors-

ing position "A" 90% of the time that he responded (50% of those times

were rewarding "A", and 50% were punishing "B")

,

and the responses

Indicated that he endorsed "B" the other 10% of the time.

17

(2)

B"^A condition - The reinforcements for the first ten trials

indicated that position "B" was endorsed 90% of the time that the participant responded, while position "A" was endorsed 10% of the time that
he responded (in the 50%,

B^A

condition, position A was not endorsed).

During the next ten trials, the responses indicated that position "A"
was endorsed 90% of the time that he responded, and position "B" was

endorsed 10% of the time that he responded (in the 50%, B^ A condition,

position B was not endorsed)
(3)

A

& B

condition - The reinforcements were distributed randomly

among the trials so that 50% of the times that the participant responded
he endorsed "A", and 50% of the times he endorsed "B".

Control Group

Traditional research in the attribution area has scored "attributions"
in terms of the absolute magnitude of the post-informational beliefs or

attitudes (e.g., Jones, Davis and Gergen, 1961; Jones and Harris, 1967).

Ajzen (1971) has argued that there are compelling methodological and
theoretical reasons for treating attributions as,

"...

an estimate of

change in attributed disposition (e.g., attitude) that results from

information about an actor's behavior" (Ajzen, 1971,

p.

145).

Thus,

the strength of an attribution would be reflected in the amount of

change produced by new information.

In light of this position, a Control Group was employed in the

design from which difference

or change scores were generated.

Subjects

as normal
in this group participated in the experimental procedures

subjects except that they were told that while their reinforcement
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responses would be recorded by the experimenter, they would not be displayed.

Thus, subjects in the Control Group hear the

sarae

"conditioning"

tape, saw the same video tape of the perceptual discrimination task, and

then heard the same "check" tape.

The only difference between the Con-

trol Group and the experimental groups was that the Control Group sub-

jects had no feedback concerning the nature of the participant's reinforcement responses.

There were fifteen pairs of subjects in the Control

Group.

RESULTS

For purposes of analysis, each pair of subjects was treated as
the experimental unit.

Thus, Consistency and Entity were tested as

"between pair" factors, while Role (Participant-Observer) was treated
as a "within pair" factor.

An analysis of variance on the three factors

(fifteen pairs per cell) was performed on experimental subjects' responses to each item of the questionnaire.

These scores will be re-

ferred to as "absolute" scores since they "represent the absolute or

final position of the subject's attitude or belief following observation of the participant's reinforcing behavior.

Because an attribution can be conceptualized as a change of

inferred attitude or belief following the observation of some event,
difference scores were also obtained.

The Control Group, consisting of

thirty subjects who were exposed to the entire experimental procedure

except that the participant's "reinforcement responses" were not displayed, was included in the design to provide a baseline against which
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to evaluate the impact of information concerning the experimental parti-

cipant's reinforcing behaviors.
For each questionnaire item, the mean response of the Control

Group subjects who served as participant (but who received no feedback

concerning reinforcement responses) was subtracted from the response of
the experimental participant (who did receive feedback concerning rein-

forcement responses)

.

The same procedure was used to generate difference

scores for subjects who served as observers in the experimental conditions.

Thus, the Control Group scores represent the subjects' impressions

that result from having gone through the experimental procedure without

being informed as to the nature of the participant's reinforcing behavior.
The absolute score represents impressions that result from having gone

through the experimental procedure an d having observed the participant's

reinforcing behavior.

The difference score represents the effect of

the displayed reinforcing behaviors on the impressions of the subjects.
Thus, it is possible for the significance of the Role variable to fluct-

uate depending upon whether one is concerned with Control Group scores,

absolute scores, or difference scores.

For example, experimental parti-

abcipants and observers might differ greatly on some attribute when

observers
solute scores are examined, but Control Group participants and

might have very similar scores on that attribute which fall

on the

scores.
scale in a position somewhere between the two absolute

In

would have very
such a case, experimental participants and observers
been unequally
dissimilar difference scores, indicating that they have

reinforcing behaviors.
affected by knowledge of the participant's
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An analysis of variance disclosed significant differences between
the responses of Control Group participants and observers on only the

following items:
The observer thought that the participant's reinforcements would
be significantly (Y-^ 28 ~ ^-SS, p < .05) more "predictable"
(Mean = 6.53) than did the participant (Mean = 4.53).
The observer thought that the participant's reinforcements would
be significantly (Fi,28 = A. 38, p < .05) more "helpful" (Mean=
5.67) than did the participant (Mean = 4.47).
The participant thought that his reinforcements were significantly
(Ti 28 ~ 7.9, p < .05) more determined by the answers given on
the tape (Mean = 7.53) than did the observer (Mean = 5.6).

All other tests for differences between the responses of Control Group

participants and observers were nonsignificant.

Manipulation Checks
Subjects were asked to characterize the participant's reinforcing

behavior on a number of graphic rating scales.
questionnaire items.)

(See Appendix III for

Two items, Consistent-Inconsistent and Predict-

able-Unpredictable, were included as checks on the Consistency manipulation.
-

The analysis of variance of the absolute and the difference

scores indicated a significant

(p

of reinforcements for both items.

< .05)

main effect due to Consistency

Table 1 reports the means, F-values,

and significance levels for these effects.
These findings support the assumption that a 90%, constant magnitude reinforcement schedule would be regarded as more consistent and

more predictable than a 50%, varied-magnitude reinforcement schedule.
The main effect of the Consistency manipulation for the difference
more
scores indicates that subjects "revised" their impression much
= -1.45,
after being exposed to the Low Consistency condition (Mean
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Table 1
Means for Rated Consistency and Predictability
for Each Consistency Level

Absolute Scores

ConsistentInconsistent

PredictableUnpredictable

High
Consistency

5.6

5.2

Low
Consistency

A.

4.3

'-''^
^1,84 =

F-values
p <

.05

p <

.05

Difference Scores

ConsistentInconsistent

PredictableUnpredictable

High
Consistency

-.4

-.35

Low
Consistency

-1.46

-1.21

F-values

=

^,84
p <

.01

p <

.05
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negative number indicates a change toward the "Very Inconsistent" end
of the scale)

than they did after being exposed to the High Consistency

condition (Mean = -.AO).

Thus, both reinforcement schedules were less

consistent than expected, and the change toward perceived inconsistency
in the Low Consistency condition was much greater than in the High

Consistency condition.

The means for the Predictable-Unpredictable

item add further support for the manipulation's effectiveness.

Tlie

Low Consistency condition was much less predictable than expected, and
subjects who received that condition "revised" their judgments to a

much greater degree than did subjects who received the High Consistency
condition.
As another check on the Consistency manipulation, subjects were

asked to estimate the percentage of trials on which the participant
1)

rewarded, 2) punished,

rewarded and punished.

3)

neither rewarded nor punished, and

A)

both

(The last category did not actually occur;

however, it was included on the questionnaire because the participant

was ostensibly producing the displayed responses and they could have

been of any nature.)
(p

< .05)

The analysis of variance indicates a significant

main effect due to Consistency of reinforcements on the first

three estimates for both the absolute and difference scores.

means are reported in Table

2.

The

Both sets of analyses support the

assumption that, at least on the frequency of reinforcement dimension,
the manipulation was effective in varying perceived consistency.
As a check on the Entity manipulation, subjects were asked to

estimate the percentage of trials on which the participant endorsed
neither.
position A on the video tape, endorsed position B, or endorsed
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Table

2

Means for Estimated Percentage
of Reinforcements for Each Consistency Level

Absolute Scores

% Rewarded

% Punished

% Neither

Rewarded
Nor Punished

High
Consistency

56.9

31.2

9.6

Low
Consistency

44.7

22.4

32.1

F-values

=

F

^1,84
p < .01

= 45.

1,84
p <

.01

p <

.01

Difference Scores

% Rewarded

% Punished

% Neither

Rewarded
Nor Punished

High
Consistency

12.6

7.7

-5.8

Low
Consistency

.4

-16.5

16.7

=

F-values

^.84
p <

.01

p <

.01

p <

.01
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The analysis of variance of the absolute scores indicated a significant

main effect due to the Entity manipulation on the estimate of the number
of trials the participant endorsed position A.

For the difference

scores, a significant main effect due to Entity was also found on the

estimated percentage of trials that position A had been endorsed, but
not on the other two estimates.

A simple effects test performed on

the Entity main effect indicates a significant difference between the

90% A and the B->A conditions (Newman-Keuls critical value for both

absolute and difference scores = 11.4, p
parisons were not significant.

< .05),

while the other com-

These data suggest that, at least for

this index, the manipulation of consistency with regard to what the

participant reinforced did not have the expected effect.

These find-

ings also suggest that any effects hypothesized to be the result of the

Entity manipulation are in jeopardy.
There was a significant main effect

(p

< .05)

due to Consistency

on all three measures regarding what was reinforced for both the

absolute and difference scores.
Table

3.

These means are also reported in

The fact that the Consistency main effect was found significant

adds further support for the assumption that the Consistency manipula-

tion had the desired effect.

Characterization of the Reinforcements
The first set of questionnaire items dealt with how subjects chardimenacterized the participant's reinforcing behavior on a number of

sions (See Appendix III for the questionnaire items).

In addition to

there was a
the findings already reported as manipulation checks,
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Table

3

Means for Estimated Percentage of Endorsements

Absolute Scores
% Endorsed
Position A

% Endorsed
Position B

% Endorsed

High
Consistency

49.5

39.1

13.8

Low
Consistency

36.1

31.8

31.0

F

1,84

.01

p <

= 5.5

p < .05

Neither

F

1,84

= 27.9

p <

.01

% Endorsed
Position A

90% A

B-)-

A

50.6

A

35.7

& B

41.8

F- value

-

^2,84
p <

.05

Difference Scores
% Endorsed

Position A

% Endorsed
Position B

High
Consistency

11.7

-.58

-5.6

Low
Consistency

-1.2

% Endorsed

F- values

F

o/

= 22.

1,84
p <

.01

11.5

-7.9
F

Neither

= 5.5

1,84
p <

.05

p <

.01

Table

3

(Continued)

Difference Scores

% Endorsed

Position A

90% A

B-»-

A

A

12.

-1.6
4.5

& B

F-value

=

^2,84
p <

.05

significant main effect for Role on difference scores dealing with

judged consistency and predictability.
reported in Table

4.

The means for these effects are

They indicate that the observer "revised" his

inference about the consistency of the participant's reinforcing behavio

more than did the participant, while each perceived the reinforcing

behavior as less consistent than expected.

Also, the amount of change

the observer underwent in the "unpredictable" direction (Mean = -1.A6)
was significantly different from the amount of change the participant

underwent in the "predictable" direction (Mean = .103).

As reported

earlier, it should be noted that within the Control Group, the observer

thought that the participant's behavior would be significantly more

predictable than did the participant.
An analysis of how Helpful-Unhelpful the reinforcing behavior had

been perceived to be indicated significant Consistency and Entity
main effects for both absolute and difference scores, and a significant
Role main effect for the difference scores.
for these effects.

Table

5

reports the means

For the Consistency main effect, the means for the

absolute scores indicate that the High Consistency condition was perceived as more helpful than the Low Consistency condition.

For the

difference scores, they indicate that the High Consistency condition
was perceived as more helpful, while the Low Consistency condition
was perceived as less helpful, the difference between the two being

significant.

For the Role main effect, the significant difference was

more helpful
the result of participants perceiving their behavior as
helpful than
than expected, while the observers perceived it as less

expected.

Within the Control Group, observers had thought the
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Table

A

Mean of Participant and Observer
Ratings of Predictability and Consistency

Difference Scores

PredictableUnpredictable

Participant
Observer

ConsistentInconsistent

+ .10

-.43

-1.66

-1.43
=

F-values

^,84
p

< .01

p <

.05
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Table

5

Mean for Ratings of Helpfulness,
Fairness and Desirability

Helpful-Unhelpful
Absolute
Scores

High
Consistency

5.5

Low
Consistency

A.

F-values

p < .05

Absolute
Scores

Difference
Scores

A

& B

A. 85

-.22

4.95

-.12

5.7

+ .63
= 4.9
F
^2,84

F-value
p

< .05

Difference
Scores

Participant
Observer
F-value

=

^,84

< .05

90% A

A

.44

-.25

''^
^1,84 =
p

B-*-

Difference
Scores

.46

-.27

''^^
^1,84 =
p < .05

p <

.05
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Table

5

(Continued)

Fair-Unfair

Absolute
Scores
90% A

5.8

.3

A

4.9

-.6

& B

5.5

B-*-

A

Difference
Scores

.04

F- value

2,84
p

< .05

p <

.05

Difference

Participant

.41

Observer
F-values

-.58
=

^1,84
p

< .01

Desirable- Undesirable
Absolute
Scores

Difference
Scores

High
Consistency

5.7

.16

Low
Consistency

5.2

-.37

F-values

=4.1

F
p

< .05

p <

.05
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Table 5
(Continued)

Desirable-Undesirable

Absolute
Scores

Difference
Scores

5.3

-.28

A

5.0

-.50

& B

5.9

.45

90% A

B->

A

F-values

''^
^2,84 =
p < .05

=

^,84
p <

.05
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participant's behavior was significantly more helpful than did the
participants.
The analysis of how Fair-Unfair the participant's reinforcing

behavior had been indicated a significant Role main effect for difference scores and an Entity main effect for both the absolute and the

difference scores.

The means for these effects are reported in Table 5.

For the absolute scores, the participant perceived the behavior as less

fair than did the observer.

However, analysis of the difference scores

indicated that the participant's "revision" toward the "Fair" end of
the scale differed significantly from the observer's "revision" toward

the "Unfair" end of the scale.

The analysis of how Desirable-Undesirable the reinforcements had

been yielded a significant Consistency main effect and a significant
Entity main effect for both the absolute and difference scores.
means for these effects are reported in Table

5.

The

With regard to the

absolute scores, the High Consistency condition was perceived as more

desirable than the Low Consistency condition.

Furthermore, the differ-

ence scores revealed that the "revision" for the High Consistency con-

dition was in the "desirable" direction while the "revision" for the

Low Consistency condition was in the "undesirable" direction, and the
difference between the two conditions was significant.

Decision Freedom
Four items were designed to measure the amount of perceived

decision freedom.

The following two items yielded similar results:

2

How free did the [participant] feel to decide, on each particular
trial, to reward the [subject] in the video tape for an answer
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he had previously punished?
(All wording for items is taken
from the observer's questionnaire.) How free did the
[participant] feel to decide, on each particular trial, to
punish the [subject] in the video tape for an answer he had
previously rewarded?

The analysis of variance indicated a significant Consistency X

Role interaction on both items, for both the absolute and the difference
scores.

The means for this effect are reported in Table 6.

For both

items, analysis of the absolute scores using the Newman-Keuls simple

effects test also indicated that the participant attributed less freedom
to himself than did the observer when in the High Consistency condition

(Critical value = 1.35, p

< .05).

For the first item only, the simple

effects test also indicated that the participant attributed less decision

freedom to himself in the High Consistency condition than in the Low
Consistency condition.

For the difference scores this last finding was

again found to be significant.

The means indicate that for the partici-

pant, the "revision" toward less freedom in the High Consistency condi-

tion was significantly different from the "revision" toward greater

freedom in the Low Consistency condition (Critical value = 1.A8,
p

<.05).

The simple effects test also indicated a significant dif-

ference between the participant and the observer in the Low Consistency

condition (Critical value = 1.35,

p<

.05).

Another perceived decision freedom item asked, "How free did the
[participant] feel to decide, on each particular trial, that the
[subject] in the video, tape deserved neither reward nor punishment?"
^
There was a significant main effect due to Consistency (F^^sA
p

<.05) on the absolute scores, and a significant main effect due to

Consistency

(F,

^,

- 5.53, p

<.05) on the difference scores.

These
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Table

6

Means for Rated Decision Freedom Items

How free did the participant feel to decide, on each particular trial,
to reward the subject for an answer he had previously punished?
Absolute
Scores

Difference
Scores

Participant
High
Consistency

3.9

-.9

Low
Consistency

5.6

+.9

Observer
High
Consistency

5.3

Low
Consistency

4.6

F-values

F

1,84

.00

-.7

=14.4
< .01

p

=

^1,84
p <

.01

How free did the participant feel to decide, on each particular trial,
to punish the subject for an answer he previously rewarded?
Absolute
Scores

Difference
Scores

Participant
High
Consistency

4.2

.0

Low
Consistency

4.9

.7

Observer
High
Consistency

5.1

.0

Low
Consistency

4.5

-.6

F-values

p

'-'^

=

^,84
<

.

05

=

^1.84
p

<

^•°>
.05
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Table 6
(Continued)

How free did the participant feel to decide, on each particular trial,
that the subject deserved neither reward nor punishment?

Absolute
Scores

Difference
Scores

High
Consistency

4.6

-.3

Low Consistency

5.5

+.6

F-value

'-'^
^1,84 =
p < .05

5-5'
^1,84 =
p <

.05
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means are reported in Table 6.

For the absolute scores, they indicate

that greater decision freedom was attributed in the Low Consistency

condition than in the High Consistency condition.

The difference

scores indicate that both the participant and observer "revised" their

judgments toward the "Very Free" direction in the Low Consistency condition, while they "revised" their judgments in the "Very Unfree"

direction in the High Consistency condition.
The following item was also designed to measure perceived decision
freedom:
*

"On each particular trial, how free did the [participant] feel

to change his mind about which answer should be rewarded and which should

be punished?"

There were no significant effects for this item.

Thus, the four items used to assess attributed decision freedom

provide somewhat inconsistent support for the hypothesis that High Consistency leads to the attribution of less decision freedom than does

Low Consistency.

The data indicate that this tendency is more pro-

nounced for the participant than for the observer.

Outcome Freedom
The following three items were designed to evaluate the amount of

outcome freedom attributed to the participant by the participant and
the observer:

How free was the [participant] to give rewards and punishments
to the [subject] in the video tape when he wanted to do so?
How free was the [participant] to withhold rewards and punishments from the [subject] in the video tape when he wanted
to do so?
In general, how free was the [participant] to reinforce the
[subject] the way he wanted to?

items),
The correlations among these items are .59 (first and second
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.89 (first and third items), and .65 (second and third items)

(p< .01).

These three items were summed to give a composite outcome freedom
score.

The analysis of the absolute composite score indicated a sig-

nificant Role main effect while the analysis of the composite difference score indicated a marginally significant
effect.

(p

< .08)

Role main

An examination of the absolute means (reported in Table

7)

indicates that the observer attributed more outcome freedom to the

participant than did the participant himself.

The means of the dif-

ference scores reveal that the participant's "revision" toward the
\

"Unfree" end of the scale was greater than the observer's.

Thus, there

is no support for the hypothesis that the High Consistency condition

would lead to the attribution of greater outcome freedom than would the

Low Consistency condition.

Correct Position in the Perceptual Discrimination Task
Subjects were asked to indicate, on a nine-step bi-polar scale,
their degree of certainty that position A or position B on the video
tape was the correct position.

The analysis of variance indicated a

significant Entity X Role interaction for both absolute and difference
scores, as well as significant Role and Entity main effects for the

absolute scores.

The means for these effects are reported in Table

8.

A simple effects test on the Entity main effect for the absolute scores
indicated that subjects were significantly more certain that A was
the correct position in the 90% A condition than in either the B ->A

condition or the A

& B

condition.

This is partial support for the

hypothesis that what one reinforces is construed as an indication of
what one believes is correct.
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Table

7

Means of Composite Outcome
Freedom Score

Absolute
Scores

Difference
Scores

Participant

12.62

-4.9

Observer

15.27

-3.2

F-value
p

< .05

p <

.08

Table 8

Mean Certainty Ratings of
Correct Position

Absolute
Scores

Absolute
Scores

Participant

90% A

Observer

B->-

F- value

A

5.9

A

A.

4.9

& B

F-value

Absolute Scores
Participant

Observer

90% A

5.8

6.0

B -^A

3.8

5.9

A

5.0

4.8

& B

F-value

F2^g^ = 4.95, p<.05

Difference Scores
Participant

Observer

90% A

1.0

0.7

B ->A

-.8

0.6

A

0.4

-.6

& B

F

2,84
3.3, p < 05
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The means for the Role main effect in the absolute data demon-

strated that observers were more certain about which position they
thought the participant believed to be correct than were the participants.

An analysis of the interaction for the absolute scores in-

dicates that the participant and the observer differed significantly
in their beliefs concerning the correct position only in

(Newman-Keuls

critical value = 1.59, p

B^A

condition

< .05).

Control Responses
The following two items were used to evaluate the amount of control the participant believed he exercised over his reinforcing

behavior:

How much control do you think the [participant] believed he
possessed over the conditioned thumb responses?
How much control did the [participant] feel he exercised over
the amount of money he gave during the reinforcement session?
The inter-item correlation was .77

(p

< .01).

The two items were

summed and an analysis of variance for the composite control score
indicated a significant main effect due to Role

(F,

lyO^

= 16.71, p

< .01)
j

for the absolute scores, but there were no significant effects in the

i

j

analysis of the difference scores.

The means are reported in Table

9.

The means for the absolute data indicate that the observer felt that
the participant possessed much greater control over the conditioned

responses and the money given than did the participant.
It was thought that subjects may have felt that while the partici-

pant demonstrated good control during the conditioning phase of the

experiment and during the check on the control that followed the
reinforcement phase of the experiment, his control may not have been

41

Table

9

Means for Rated and Derived Control
Scores

Composite Control Score
Absolute
Scores

Participant
Observer
F- value

Scores for Discrepancy Between Control in Conditioning and Reinforcement
Phases of Experiment

Absolute
Scores

Difference
Scores

Participant

.86

.93

Observer

.18

.17

F-values

=

^,84
p<

.05

Absolute
Scores

p<

Difference
Scores

High
Consistency

.22

.26

Low
Consistency

.81

.87

F-values

.05

=

^1.84
p <.05

p <.05

Table

9

(Continued)

Absolute Scores for Discrepancy Index

High
Consistency

Low
Consistency
F-value

Participant

Observer

.31

.13

1.4

.22

^1 84 "

P <-056

Difference Scores for Discrepancy Index
Participant

Observer

High
Consistency

.38

.13

Low
Consistency

1.47

.22

F-value

F^

= 3.82, p< .056

A3

very good during the reinforcement phase.

To evaluate any such tendency,

a difference score between "general control" and "control over
reinforce-

ments" was obtained for both the participant and the observer.

An

analysis of variance for the absolute scores and the difference scores
indicated a significant main effect for Consistency and Role
and a marginally significant Role X Consistency interaction

(p <
(p

.05),

< .056).

The means for the absolute and difference scores (reported in Table

9)

indicate that subjects reported greater discrepancy between general
.

control and reinforcement control in the Low Consistency condition than
in the High Consistency condition.

The means for the Role main effect

show that the participant reported a greater discrepancy than did the
observer.

The means for the marginally significant Role X Consistency inter-

action are also reported in Table

A simple effects test indicates

9.

that for both the absolute and the difference scores the discrepancy
in control for the participant in the Low Consistency condition was

significantly greater than the amount of discrepancy reported in the
other three cells (Newman-Keuls critical value for the ordered

differences are:

1.163, 1.06, .882, p

<.05).

Perceived Constraints
Subjects responded to the item, "To what degree were the rewards
and punishments the [participant] gave determined by the answers given

by the [subject] in the video tape?"

A Consistency X Entity X Role

interaction was significant in the analysis of both absolute and difference scores.

There was also a marginally significant

(p

< .065)
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Role main effect in the absolute analysis, while the Role main
effect
was highly significant (p

< .01)

for the difference scores.

Inspec-

tion of the second-order interaction did not suggest any psychologically

significant implications.
ported in Table 10.

The means for the Role main effect are re-

For the absolute scores, the means indicate that

the observer rated the participant's reinforcements as being more com-

pletely determined by the subject's answers than did the participant.
For the difference scores (as reported earlier, the participant and

observer differed on this item in the Control Group, with the participant anticipating that the responses would be more determined by the

subject's answers than did the observer) there was greater "revision"
by the participant than by the observer, while both moved toward the

"Completely Undetermined" end of the scale.

Analysis of difference scores indicated a significant Role main
effect on responses to the item, "To what degree did the [participant]
feel that it was unnecessary to punish the [subject] every time he gave
an answer he believed to be incorrect?"

With a significant difference

in the amounts of "revision" by the two roles, the participant showed

"revision" toward the "Completely Necessary" end of the scale (Mean =
.54), while the observer underwent "revision" toward the "Completely

Unnecessary" end (Mean = -.74).

Analysis of the absolute scores

indicated no significant effects on responses to this item.
For the item, "To. what degree did the [participant] feel that it

was unnecessary to reward the participant every time he gave an answer

which the [subject] in the video tape believed to be correct?", there
was a significant Role main effect for the difference scores, but no

Table 10
Means for Perceived Constraint
Item

Absolute
Scores

Difference
Scores

Participant

4.75

-2.77

Observer

5.40

-.16

F-values

=

^1,84

p<

=

^,84
.065

P< .01
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significant effects for the absolute scores.

The means indicate that

the participant's reinforcing behavior evoked significantly greater

"revision" by the participant (Mean = -1.76) than by the observer
(Mean = -.90), with both moving toward the "Completely Unnecessary"

end of the scale.

Analysis of absolute and difference scores revealed no significant
effects on any of the following:

How relaxed was the [participant] during the reinforcement
session?
How important in determining the [participant's] behavior was
his belief that one of the positions was correct?
How important in determining the [participant's] behavior
was his estimate of the difficulty of the perceptual discrimination task?
The MacDonald and Tseng Internal-External scale.
The multiple-choice "causation" item (McArthur, 1972).
Four items yielded significant Role main effects when analyzed on
the basis of absolute scores, but no significant effects when analyzed
in terms of difference scores.
in Table 11.

The means for these items are reported

The means indicate that the observer attached greater

importance than did the participant to control of the thumb responses
and to the participant's own generosity and stinginess, while the

participant attached greater importance than did the observer to the
belief that the observer would want the participant to reward and

punish in a certain way, and to the influence of the participant's
thought processes on the reinforcements.
at at least the p

(All effects were significant

< .05 level except the last variable which was

significant at the p

< .07

level.)

Subjects were asked to estimate the importance of the participant's
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Table 11
Means for Perceived Constraints

Importance of Control of Reinforcements
Absolute
Scores

Participant
Observer
F- value

Importance of Participant's Own Generosity and Stinginess

Absolute
Scores
Participant

Observer
F-value

Importance of Belief that the Observer Would Want the Participant To
Reward In a Certain Way
Absolute
Scores

Participant
Observer

F-value

Table 11
(Continued)

How Much Influence Did the Participant's Thought Process Have On
the Reinforcements?
Absolute
Scores

Participant

5.8

Observer

5.1

F-value
p < .07

Fair Play

Difference
Scores

Absolute
Scores

High
Consistency

5.6

-.1

Low
Consistency

4.7

-.6

F-value

^,84=^-^>
p<

•

^,84

.05

Cause of Reinforcing Behavior Internal or External?

Difference
Scores

Participant
Obseirver

F-value

= '-'^

p< .05
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belief, "that equity and fair play demand that people get what
they

deserve," as a determinant of his reinforcing behavior.

The analysis

of the absolute and difference scores indicated a significant
Con-

sistency main effect.

The means for the effects are reported in Table 11.

For the absolute scores, the means suggest that the High Consistency

condition resulted in greater attributed importance than did the Low

Consistency condition.

The difference scores show, however, that the

Low Consistency condition resulted in greater reduction in attributed
importance than did the High Consistency condition.
Subjects were asked to estimate whether they felt that the locus
of causation for the reinforcing behavior was internal or external.

Analysis of the absolute scores indicated no significant effects, while
the analysis of the difference scores revealed a significant main effect
due to Role.

The means, reported in Table 11, indicate that while both

the participant and observer "revised" their estimates in the internal

direction, the participant's "revision" was greater.
For the item, "How hard did the participant try to reward the

correct response and punish the incorrect response?", analysis of the

absolute scores revealed a significant Consistency X Entity interaction
(p

< .01).

The means are reported in Table 12.

indicated that the High Consistency, A
ficantly from all other conditions.

& B

Simple effects test

condition differed signi-

In addition, the High Consistency

condition and the Low Consistency condition differed significantly from
each other under the

B->

A condition.
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Table 12

Means of Effort Item

Absolute Scores

High
Consistency

Low
Consistency

90% A

6.25

6.50

B->-

7.0

A

4.A6

& B

F-value

.

F

5.21
6.67

„

2,84

= 10.21, p <.01
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DISCUSSION

The hypotheses that guided this research dealt with the impact of

behavioral consistency on observers' and participants' attributions of
freedom.

Consistency was defined in terms of

(a)

the frequency, and

constancy of magnitude, of reinforcing behaviors and
of the entity that was reinforced.

(b)

the constancy

Both attributed decision freedom

and attributed outcome freedom were examined, and it was predicted that

manipulated consistency would have similar or identical effects on the
attributions of observers and participants.
The data provided little evidence that behavioral consistency

affected attributed freedom, but abundant evidence that it affected
subjects' evaluations of observed behaviors, and their attributions to
the participants who produced them.

Furthermore, manipulated consistency

sometimes had markedly different effects on observers and participants.

After discussing possible reasons why attributed freedom was comparatively unaffected by manipulated consistency, attention will be focused
on the many observer vs

.

participant differences that are revealed by

the data.

Hypothesis One contended that both observers and participants
would attribute less decision freedom to the participant when his reinforcing behavior was consistent than when it was inconsistent.

Four

questionnaire items were employed to assess attributed decision freedom.
Participants' responses to two of these items supported the hypothesis,

whereas observers' responses to only one item did so.

By comparison

on
with the results of earlier research that had tested this hypothesis

observers only (Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973; Davidson and
Steiner, 1971) the present findings are rather weak.

The second hypothesis predicted that both participants and

observers would attribute less decision freedom when the participant
almost invariably reinforced one entity than when he sometimes reinforced Entity A and sometimes Entity B.

were employed:

Two "alternating" schedules

in one case the participant reinforced Entity B during

the first 10 trials and then switched to Entity A for the last ten

trials, whereas in the other case the participant distributed his rein-

forcements in a somewhat random fashion.

Unfortunately, these mani-

pulations did not have the intended effects on subjects' perceptions.

A manipulation check indicated that, although a pattern of reinforcements that endorsed Entity A 90% of the time was seen to differ from
one that switched from Entity B to Entity A midway through the trials,

neither of them was judged to be significantly different from the
"random" pattern.

There were no significant effects to the Entity

manipulation on attributed decision freedom.
Hypothesis Three predicted that both observers and participants

would attribute greater outcome freedom to the participant when his
reinforcing behaviors were consistent than when they were inconsistent.
Three questionnaire items were employed to assess outcome freedom
(freedom of the participant to accomplish his desired end)

.

Inter-

item correlations were high, and the three items were combined to
yield a composite score.

No significant effects of behavioral con-

sistency on attributed outcome freedom were obtained.

However,

than did
observers attributed significantly greater outcome freedom
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participants.

Hypothesis Four contended that both observers and participants
who observed reinforcing behavior that consistently endorsed or

supported Entity A rather than Entity B would conclude that the participant personally regarded Entity A as the correct or preferred one.
As noted earlier, the Entity manipulation had the intended perceptual

effects only for the condition in which Entity A was consistently

endorsed and the condition in which Entity B was endorsed during the
first half of the trials and Entity A was endorsed during the last half
of the trials.

Consistent with Hypothesis Four, these two conditions

yielded significantly different estimates of the participant's certainty
that Entity A was the correct one.

In addition to the main effect of

these two conditions, observers were significantly more confident than

were participants that the participant believed Entity A to be the
correct alternative.
Failure to confirm Hypothesis Two can be explained as a consequence
of the weak or ineffective manipulation of the Entity variable.

But

faulty manipulations do not account for the rather inconsistent support
of Hypothesis One or the total absence of support for Hypothesis Three.

In fact, the effect of the Consistency manipulation closely paralleled
its effect in previous research (Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973).

predictability,
It was successful in varying the perceived consistency,

and frequency of reinforcements.

In addition, the High Consistency

likely
condition was perceived as more helpful, more desirable, more

and as reflecting
to involve an attempt to please the experimenter,

equity and fair play considerations to a greater extent.

These findings
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support the assumption made in this research and previous research
(Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973; Davidson and Steiner, 1971) that

subjects believe highly consistent behavior to be a consequence of

normative considerations, social expectations, and social desirability.
Since the Consistency manipulations had many of the same effects

noted in earlier studies, failure to obtain strong support for two of
the hypotheses would appear to reflect other features of the present
study.

The conditions created by the present experiment were quite

different from those under which Hypothesis One had been strongly
supported for observers in the past.

In the research by Davidson and

Steiner (1971) and Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner (1973) there was little

room for an observer to question the participant's freedom to do whatever he decided to do.

Once the participant decided to reward or not

to reward a particular act, he could readily provide or withhold the

monetary reinforcements at his disposal.

Furthermore, the merits of

the acts that justified reward or punishment were clear to the ob-

server:

He knew which acts were "correct" and which were not.

Under

these circumstances the only uncertainty pertained to the participant's

freedom to decide for himself whether and when to administer rewards
and punishments.

In the present study three critical elements of the situation

were unclear to the subjects.

First, although a strong attempt was

formers' thumbs
made to convince participants and observers that the

subject may have been
had been adequately conditioned, neither kind of
could deliver the
very thoroughly convinced that the participant

rewards and punishments he wished to deliver.

In response to questionnaire
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items observers rated the participant's control of his reinforcing

behaviors at only about the midpoint of the graphic scale, and the
participants themselves were even more dubious of their control.

The

same low level of conviction was revealed by responses to outcome

freedom items.
Secondly, in the present study neither observers nor participants

could feel very certain of the quality of the acts that were observed.
It is to be recalled that the two lines (Entities A and B) were iden-

tical, so subjects had no real basis for concluding that the choice of

one was more commendable or correct than the choice of the other.
Thirdly, in previous studies subjects were instructed to "reinforce
as you think appropriate."

However, in the present research, the ex-

perimenter endeavored to create a very different mental set.

He

asked the participant to sit back, relax, and watch the video tape,
since the experimenter was only interested in observing how the thumb

responses reacted when they represented reinforcements.

References to

the idea that the participant was to reinforce as he thought appropriate

were avoided entirely, and corrected if mentioned by either subject,
since they would have made the predictions of Hypothesis Four trivial.
However, it was assumed that subjects might still infer that the participant was doing what he wanted to do.

These uncertainties permitted participants and observers to interpret the participant's behaviors in more than one way.

For instance,

changing his opinion
an inconsistent participant could be perceived as
as to whether line A or line B was the correct one.

Alternatively,

out various
perhaps. his opinion was constant but he was trying
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reinforcement strategies.

Or, perhaps his opinion was not changing,

but his ability to deliver intended reinforcements was faulty.

Simi-

larly, a consistent, participant might be seen as one who was unable or

unwilling to deliver a complex pattern of reinforcements.

Thus, incon-

sistent reinforcing behavior could be interpreted as indicating either
the presence of decision freedom (freedom to change one's mind about

which entity should be reinforced or how reinforcement should be given)
or the absence of outcome freedom (freedom to deliver the reinforce-

ments one wishes to deliver)

.

Consistent reinforcing behavior could

be interpreted to imply an absence of decision freedom or an absence of

outcome freedom (in this case, freedom to deliver reinforcements in a

way that would result in inconsistency)
It appears reasonable to suggest that the consistency of a rein-

forcing agent's behaviors provides evidence concerning his decision

freedom only when he is believed to possess considerable outcome
freedom (freedom to do what he decides to do).

Conversely, the con-

sistency of his behavior constitutes strong evidence concerning his outcome freedom only when there is reason to believe he prefers and

intends to pursue one course of action rather than another.

(Otherwise

actions
it is unclear whether the consistency/inconsistency of his

reflects his freely chosen strategy or his inability to produce the

behaviors required by his chosen strategy.

When viewed in this light, the data relevant to Hypotheses One
and Three seem reasonable enough.

The consistency of the participant's

of decision
behaviors did not have strong effects on the attribution

believed he had very
freedom, because neither participants nor observers
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much outcome freedom.

And consistency did not have much effect on the

attribution of outcome freedom because the entities which were to be
selectively reinforced were identical and, therefore, provided no basis
for real preference.

Perhaps this interpretation is more applicable

to observers than to participants because the latter presumably knew

that they sometimes intended to reinforce one entity rather than the
other.

Such knowledge of intentions, available only to the participant,

would explain why the participant felt he had less control than the
observer thought he had, and his tendency to report a greater discrepancy between general control of responses and control during the reinforcement phase.

Correlations reported in Table 13 support this line of reasoning.

The correlations indicate that outcome freedom and control were significantly (p < .01) related.

Thus, only when the subjects assumed that

the participant had control of the thumb responses did they assume that

he was able to produce the responses he desired.

The correlations

indicate that both attributed control and outcome freedom were positively related to the inferred effect of thought processes on the

conditioned

thiunb

responses, and the degree that reinforcements were

believed to be influenced by the answers given on the video tape.

The

table also lists the correlations between the decision freedom items

and the other variables.
In the two previous studies in this series, no distinction was
freedom.
made between attributed decision freedom and attributed outcome
(1971)
Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner (1973) and Davidson and Steiner
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Table 13

Correlation Matrix for Selected
Variables

Answers
Determined
by Tape

Composite
Outcome
Freedom

Composite
Control
Score

of Thought

.56 **

.41 **

.43

.41 **

.36 **

Answers
Determined
by Tape

Composite
Control
Score

Influence

Processes

.51 **

Influence
of Thought

Processes

Consistency
Free to give
neither response
Free to reward
answer previously
punished
Free to punish
answer previously
rewarded
Free to change mind

* p < .05

** p < .01
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Table 13
(Continued)

Cons istency

Free to give
neither response

Free to reward
answer previously punished

Composite
Outcome
Freedom

.33 **

.26 *

.21 *

Answers
Determined
by Tape

.45 **

.19

.10

Composite
Control
Score

.31 **

.19

.03

.38 **

.20

.09

.08

.18

Influence
of Thought
Processes

•

Consistency
Free to give
neither response

.36 **

Free to reward
answer previously
punished

Free to punish
answer previously
rewarded
Free to change
mind

* p < .05

** p < .01
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Table 13
(Continued)

Free to punish
answer previously
rewarded

to change

Composite
Outcome
Freedom

.19

.12

Answers
Determined
by Tape

.07

-.07

.41 **

Composite
Control
Score

.05

-.08

.29 **

.16

-.03

.42 **

Consistency

.17

.01

.65 **

Free to give
neither response

.30 **

.24 *

.11

.75 **

.43 **

.05

.39 **

.05

Free

mind

Predictability

.24 *

Influence
of Thought

Processes

Free to reward
answer previously
punished

Free to punish
answer previously
rewarded
Free to change
mind

* p < .05

-.04

** p < .01
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asked subjects how free the reinforcing agent had been to give rewards,
give punisliments, and, in general, how free he had been to give rein-

forcements any way he wanted (the last item

Lehtinen and Steiner)

.

v/as

used only in Bringle,

Because outcome freedom could be assumed to be

very high, responses to these inquiries were interpreted as reflecting

attributed decision freedom.
However, during preliminary stages of the present study it became

apparent that subjects were sometimes responding to these items in a

manner that reflected outcome freedom.
previous research was instituted.

For this reason, a change from

The three items were introduced with

the following short paragraph:

The following questions concern the [participant's] freedom
Once he
to carry out any plan or intention he may have had.
was he
how
free
punish,
reward
and
to
how
wanted
he
had decided
to do what he wanted to do?
It was felt that this preliminary statement would definitely provide a

set or frame of reference in which the items would be treated by the

subjects as dealing v/ith outcome freedom.

(The decision freedom items

were introduced with a paragraph that stressed the participant's
freedom to decide.)
The consistency of the correlations reported in Table 13 suggests
that the measure of outcome freedom possessed moderately high construct

validity.

However, freedom is a nebulous concept, and we may doubt

subject's
that any set of instructions will assure the validity of
ratings'.

distinWhen, as in the present study, subjects are asked to

compounded.
guish between two kinds of freedom, the problem is

One

present research were
cannot conclude that the items employed in the
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wholly satisfactory, or that we have created measures that can confidently be used in subsequent studies.

Role Differences
As already noted, a question of current interest to social psych-

ologists concerns the attribution of observers v£. participants.

In

the present study an attempt was made to create circumstances under

which observers and participants received very similar information.

If

the two kinds of subjects were found to make similar attributions,

support would have been generated for Bern's (1965, 1967, 1968) con-

tention that observers and participants employ parallel inference
processes.

But if the attributions of observers were found to differ

markedly from those of participants, one could more readily accept
Jones and Nisbett's (1971) thesis that observers and participants

process information in different ways or have access to unique sources
of information.

Although much of the evidence of the present study

appears to favor the latter conclusion, some of the findings seem consistent with Bern's theory.
In the Control Group observers and participants were exposed to

the same conditions as were their counterparts in experimental groups,

except that no information concerning the participant's reinforcing

behaviors was supplied to them.

Under these circiimstances observers

and participants expressed similar judgments in response to all but
three of forty-one items on the questionnaire.

Observers expected

prethe participant's reinforcing behavior to be significantly more

dictable and helpful and less completely determined by the video-taped

63

subject's performance, than did participants.

But in other respects

observers and participants did not differ significantly.

Failure to

reject the null hypothesis does not establish its credibility, but a

high proportion of failures is exactly what

Bern's theory v;ould predict.

The fact that one member of the pair was a performer, and the other

merely observed, had few effects on the inferences members drew concerning the participant's (largely unobservable) actions.
The general lack of differences in

tlie

Control Group also suggests

that the visual orientations of the participants and observers were not

significantly different.

During the conditioning, reinforcement, and

check phases of the experiment, the subjects sat in chairs which both
faced the video monitor and display board.

Although there was a

tendency on the part of many observers to rearrange this somewhat (in
that they usually positioned themselves so that they were able to watch
the participant and the video monitor) this evidently had little effect
in creating significantly different "perceptual orientations."

More positive support for Bem's contention is provided by data

pertinent to Hypothesis Four.

In experimental groups both observers

and participants were more prone to conclude that the participant v^o

consistently reinforced Entity A believed it to be the correct one than
to conclude that the participant who inconsistently reinforced Entity A

believed it to be correct.

Thus participants, like observers, apparently

decided they must like that which their behavior consistently endorsed,
even though the behavioral endorsements were entirely engineered by
the experimenter.

This finding is reminiscent of Bem's contention that

so often eats it.
a person concludes he must like brown bread because he
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However, we should note that observers were even more inclined than

participants to attribute a preference for Entity A when reinforcements

consistently endorsed it.

Thus, although the data on attributed prefer-

ences support Bem's theory, they leave an important observer-participant

difference unexplained.

Evidence favoring the Jones-Nisbett contention is abundantly represented in the data generated by experimental groups.

Both the absolute

and the difference scores reveal numerous differences between the in-

ferences of observers and participants.

Thus, when compared to the

participants, absolute scores indicate that observers thought that:
the reinforcements were more strongly determined by
the answers on the video tape.
*.
.
reinforcing every trial is a better strategy when one
isn't sure which answer is correct.
*. . . the participant possessed greater outcome freedom.
*. .
the discrepancy between the control of the thumb
responses in general, and during the reinforcement phase
of the experiment, was smaller.
.
position A in the perceptual discrimination task was
the correct position.
.
.
the participant ought to reinforce every trial in order
please
the experimenter.
to
participant
had greater control over the respoiises.
.
the
over
the responses, and the generosity and
.
.
.
the control
stinginess of the participant, were more important in determining the reinforcement responses.
their (the observer's) own beliefs about how the partici.
pant should reward and punish were less important.
*.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Items marked with asterisks also produced significant role effects

when analyzed in

terras of

difference scores.

In addition, several

items revealed role differences only when responses were cast in the

form of difference scores.

Thus, difference scores indicated that

observers thought that:
the participant's behavior was less consistent, predictable, helpful, and fair than expected.
.

.

.
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... it was less necessary for the participant to punish an
incorrect answer, and less unnecessary to reward a correct
answer.
the reinforcing behavior warranted less revision toward
an internal explanation.
.

.

.

It is to be recalled that observers and participants received

essentially identical information concerning the situation.

But the

numerous differences cited above indicate that the information had
different consequences on the inferences of participants and observers.
The fact that there were few Role differences among the Control Group
subjects, but many Role differences among the experimental subjects

indicates support for the Jones and Nisbett thesis that, when externally

available information is virtually identical, the inferences of the
observer and actor can differ.
Of the four factors which

Bern

(1972) listed as possible causes of

divergent perceptions, knowledge of past experiences and perceptual

differences between actor and observer were virtually eliminated, and

defensiveness was held to a minimtim.
a physiological nature

eliminated.

In addition, internal stimuli of

(e.g., proprioceptive feedback) was virtually

However, as mentioned earlier, the participant had access

to one source of information to which the observer did not:

pant

'

s

Intentions

The partici-

.

The participant's knowledge of his own intentions should be ex-

pected to affect his attributions, but not those of an observer, when
his observable behaviors are not consistent with those intentions.

These are the conditions that prevailed in Experimental Groups.

But

participants had no
in Control Groups no feedback was provided, and

with their
way of learning that their behavior was inconsistent
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Intentions.

Consequently, it is not surprising that many Role differ-

ences were obtained from Experimental Groups, but very few from Control
Groups.

Some of the Role differences obtained from Experimental Groups
are especially pertinent to the foregoing argument.

If the crucial

factor was the participant's awareness that his intentions were not

being realized, we should expect him to report low control of his own
We might also expect him to conclude that his behavior was not

behavior.

greatly influenced by the quality of the responses given by the videotaped subject, and to be less convinced than the observer that the

position he reinforced was the correct one.
supported by the data.

These expectations are

Thus, it appears reasonable to conclude that

the experimental participant's awareness of his own intentions was a

major determinant of participant-observer differences.
These findings are of crucial importance to the confrontation

between

Bern,

and Jones and Nisbett.

Bern's

earlier statements

(Bern,

1965, 1967) suggested that the behavior of the actor was the most

important information upon which he based his inferences.

And, since

the behavior was available to the observer as well, their inferences

would be identical.

However, these findings suggest that it

v;as

knowledge of behavior plus intentions that was responsible for differences between the inferences of participants and observers.

Thus,

is not
equal information concerning the environment and overt behavior

enough.

and imply
The findings support the Jones and Nisbett theory,

formulation the sources of
a need for Bern to add to his theoretical

divergence

(Bern,

1972).

Specifically, they indicate that the intention

of the actor is an important type of information, usually available

only to the actor, which cannot be neglected in theories of attribution
and inference.

Indeed, it may be the knowledge of intentions and

preferences which creates what Jones and Nisbett identify as the tendency for actors to explain their behavior with external attributions
since they know that things do not always go the way they intend or
desire, whereas observers do not.

These findings also provide strong evidence for the use of difference scores in attribution research.

While it is important to know

whether participants and observers differ in their final inferences
after having observed a behavior, it is equally important that one

what caused that difference.

knov?

This information is only available if one

knows what an individual's inference was prior to having observed the
behavior.

Similarities and differences between the analyses of the

absolute and difference scores illustrate the importance of both kinds
of information.

The present research provided examples of variables

that yielded significant Role differences on only the absolute scores

(suggesting that several factors influenced the difference)
the difference scores, and on

,

on only

both the absolute and difference scores

(indicating, in this case, that it was the observation of the behavior
that produced the significant differences).

It is apparent that much

information is either erroneously assumed or ignored if the absolute
scores, alone, are considered.
one
The use of difference scores, then, provides a means by which

can better understand the processes of attributions.

Nisbett e^ al
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(1973) stated that this is the most critical test of any research in the

area.

The present findings suggest at least one process that can

result in divergent inferences between actor and observer:

The avail-

ability, to the actor, of information about what he expected or tried
to do.
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FOOTNOTES

'"Tills

research was partially supported by a grant from the United

States Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, No.

m

20169, Ivan D. Steiner, Principal Investigator.

2

On the actual questionnaire, the participant was referred to as

"subject" and the person on the video tape was referred to as "participant."

To maintain consistency within this manuscript, the subject to

whom the electrodes were connected will be referred to as the "participant" and the person in the tape will be referred to as the "subject"
on the video tape.

These changes are bracketed when items are reported.
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SCHEDULES

High Consistency-90% A

Trial

1.

2.
3.

4.

Response

+6
-3
-3
-3

Position
Endorsed

A
A

7.
8.

9.

10.
11.
12 .
13.
lA.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19 .
20.

High Consistency-B-^A

Trial

1.

21

B

3.

A

4.

5.
6.

REINFORCEMENT

Response

Position
Endorsed

-3
+6
+6
+6

B
B

-3
+6
-3
-3
+6
+6

B
B
B
B
B

A
B

5.

+6
-3
+6
+6
-3
+6
+6
+6

-3
-3
+6
-3
+6
-3

A
A
A
A
A
A
B

A

A
A
A
A
A
A

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

-3
+6
-3
-3
+6
-3
+6
-3

A
B

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
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High Consistency-A

Trial

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

Response

Position
Endorsed

9.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Trial

+6
+6
-3
-3
-3
+6

A

1

•a

u

Z

•R

J

-3
+6
4-6

-3
+6
+6
-3

_> .

A

D

.

/

.

B

Q
O

.

A

Q

It

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

-3
+6
-3
-3
+6

a
B
6

A
B

A
A
A
B
B

Response

Position
Endorsed

T O
+12

A

-5

A

o

AA

+y

B

-7

A

-4

A

+11
-6

A
A

-5
+9

A
A

1

i

A
A

7.

8.

Low Consistency-90% A

& B

c
1

1
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Low Consistency-B~>A

Trial

Response

Low Consistency-A & B

Position
Endorsed

1.
2.

3.

1.

+12
-5

B

2.

B

3.

4.
5.

+13

B

5.
6.

+9

B

7.

-7

B

8.

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Response

Position
Endorsed

+12

A

-5

B

+13

B

+9
-7

A

+11
-4

A
A

-6

B

-5

A

+9

B

4.

6.
7.

Trial

8.

+11
-4

A
A

-6

A

-5

A

+9

A

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

B
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Script

(Subjects are seated at the table as they arrive at the
laboratory.)
This experiment deals with learning and reinforcement.
Psychologists
are extremely interested in reinforcement because of its
importance
in the learning experience, and past research has investigated
such
things as what types of reinforcers are best, when should
they be give:
and how they influence the learning process. This experiment is
interested in how people administer reinforcements under various circumstances
.

You each will assume different roles in the experiment. One of you
will be the participant and will take part in the entire experiment.
The other one will simply observe the entire proceedings of the
experiment.
In order to select which role each of you will assume,
we will allow the person whose last name comes first in the alphabet to be the participant.
Before we begin, would you each fill out a short questionnaire. Please
read the instructions before beginning and respond to all items.
(The
MacDonald-Tseng Internal-External scale is administered.)
(Directed to the subject selected as observer:) As
observe the entire experiment. Please sit here.

I said,

you will

(Directed to the participant:) Please sit here. The initial phase of
the experiment deals with conditioning a response in each of your hands.
This is done so that we may use the conditioned responses during a
later phase of the experiment. You will be exposed to an escapeavoidance task which I will explain in detail. You will wear a set
of earphones through which will be played music.
In addition, a
noise will occasionally interrupt the music. By making the appropriate response you can escape the noise after it has come on. Also
by making the appropriate response you can avoid the noise by delaying its onset.
That is, you can turn off or delay the noise by making
the correct response.
The responses we will be conditioning during the escape-avoidance
procedure are small thumb responses in each of your hands. Let me
explain their nature. Muscle behavior creates an electrical voltage.
Even when the muscle response is so small as to be invisible, this
In our case, the measuring will be done by
voltage can be measured.
Electrodes, which will be connected to your
an electromyograph.
hand, will lead to an electronic amplifier which multiplies the voltage.
The appropriate response which the electromyograph will be recording,
and the only response, is a small muscle twitch which is too small to
be perceived by you. The voltages produced by this muscle twitch are,
They vary from one to three
as you might expect, extremely small.
Please note that you can not evoke the correct response
microvolts.
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by actively moving your thumb since
this response is ton Ki. ^.
on the electromyograph and is
filtered out. 'S". in o^der'for
the"
appropriate response to become conditioned,
you m^st sit in the chair
and keep your hands and body relaxed
at all ii.es; also you must
not
^^-'^
since^th^rwiU

17.eTfl~

-

^hen the noise comes on, if a small
thumb
-ill be turned off for the
rllf
''^^
interval. Also, if the noise is off
and you
.t''\f
K twitch,
mke the
thumb
you will postpone or avoid the onset of
the
noise for five seconds. Thus, if you
respond at the rate of at least
one proper response every five seconds
when the noise is off, the
noise will remain off indefinitely. In
addition, the appropriate realternate from left to right hand. Thus,
It
ITTrllll
a right h^'/^i'T''
hand thumb response delays the noise for
a five second
interval, a left hand thumb response will
delay it for the next five
second interval, and so on. The conditioning
session will last 11
minutes, and there will be one minute of
music before the conditioninc^
begins.
Remember that during the conditioning phase it
is necessary
to remain relaxed; keep your arms, hands
and fingers still. Are there
any questions?

^Jj^h

IT

,

/

(To the observer:)
In order that you can hear the conditioning
process,
you will also be able to listen through a set of earphones.
(The electrodes are then connected to the participant and
earphones are given to
both subjects.)

(The experimenter leaves the room and plays the 11 minute
tape of music
and noise.)

That completes the conditioning phase of the experiment. The conditioning of the two thumb responses is very strong and you have good
control of the responses in each of your hands.
The subsequent part of the experiment investigates the reinforcing
behavior of individuals. You will be shown a video tape of an experimental session filmed last semester. The tape shows a person who
is working on a perceptual discrimination task which I will explain.
The person was shown pairs of lines which differed in length by a
small amount; it was his task to judge which of the two lines was the
longer. As the experiment progressed, the difference between the two
lines slowly became greater. The experimenter was interested in
determining at what point the subject would be able to reliably determine which line was the longer of the two. The experiment ended when
the subject was able to give six correct answers in a row.
Initially,
the discrimination task was extremely difficult, and it took subjects,
on the average, about fifty trials before they were able to produce
the six correct answers.
The particular subject whose performance you
will be watching was able to complete the experiment in just under the
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50 trial average.
You are going to be shown, however, only a
portion of
those trials— the first twenty trials.

Although the person was not given
going to tell you that the longer
on the card.
That is, the longer
side or on the right side. Thus,
in which position the longer line
the same position.

the following information, we are
line was always in the same position
line was always either on the left
although you don't know at this time
was, you do know it was always in

In the conditioning phase, the music and noise assumed
the role of
stimulus for the thumb responses. Now we are presenting the
tape
of the perceptual discrimination experiment as a stimulus.
We want
to see how you react to the person's performance as you view
it.
Specifically, we want to see how the conditioned thumb responses
react to the video tape v/hen they represent reinforcements. Thus,
your thumb responses will represent reinforcements, and we will be
recording how you give reinforcements as you watch the tape.

Following each response by the person on the tape, the center light
on this display panel will come on for 10 seconds. Any thumb responses
you produce during this 10 second period will be recorded on the dials
of the panel. 1 The counters on the panel will represent the total amount
of reinforcements to the person on the tape. 2 Any responses emitted
by the right hand will constitute a reward and will represent adding
five cents to the total.
The rewards will be sho\m on the top counters.
Any responses emitted by the left hand will constitute a punishment and
will represent deducting five cents from the total. These punishments
will be shown on the bottom counters. 2 The money represented by
your responses is symbolic and will represent what you would have
given the person for his performance had he actually been doing the
task as part of the present experiment. We are also interested in
when you don't give reinf orcem.ents as well as when you do give them,
since not giving reinforcements can be an important and significant
behavior in a learning setting.
,

For the Control Group subjects, this sentence was amended to read,
will be recorded in the other room, but will not be recorded on
these dials."
".

2

.

.

For the Control Group subjects, these sentences were omitted from
the instructions.
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At the beginning of the conditioning you had no
control over the thumb
responses. As the conditioning progressed, your
thought processes
gradually learned to influence them. Past research has
demonstrated
that when the conditioned thumb responses assume
the role of reinforcements, they give an indication of some of the thought
processes that
are taking place. Your job, then, is to watch the
person's performance
on the video tape, and we will be recording when you give
and don't
give reinforcements.

Remember, because we are using the conditioned responses as reinforcements, it is necessary for you to remain as relaxed as possible during
the experiment and to not make any extraneous movements, particularly
during the 10 second reinforcement period following each trial. Do
you have any questions?
(The experimenter then leaves the room and the reinforcement phase of
the experiment is administered.)

That concludes the reinforcement phase of the experiment. I now want
to run a short 4 minute escape-avoidance session similar to the one
given at the start of the experiment. This is being done in order to
recheck the amount of control you have over the conditioned responses
and to check for any improvement that may have occured during the
reinforcement phase. Remember to remain relaxed.
.

(The experimenter then leaves the room and the 4 minute tape is played.)

The conditioning is still very strong and you have good control of the
responses in both hands.
In order to get your impressions of the experiment I want each of you
to fill out a questionnaire.
Please read the instructions before you
begin and respond to all items. If any are unclear or you have a
question, please ask.
I'll figure the net amount of reinforcement,
which should be entered in the first blank.

(After the questionnaires have been filled out:) That concludes the
experiment, please write your name and address on this paper so that
I can send you an explanation of the experiment and a brief summary
of the results.

For the Control Group subjects, the procedure for figuring the net
reinforcement was explained, so that they could estimate an amount
for the first blank on the questionnaire.
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READ THE COMPLETE ITEM BEFORE RECORDING YOUR RESPONSE.
ANY ITEM.

DO NOT OMIT

What was the net reinforcement you gave to the
participant in the
video tape?
(Enter the amount)
i

Approximately ICQ subjects will participate in the experiment as
you have just done. What do you think will be the average
net
reinforcement to the participant in the video tape?
$

How would you describe or characterize your rewarding and punishing
behavior?
(Indicate your response with a check mark)
Inconsistent

:

Unpredictable

:

Very Unhelpful

:

Very Unfair

:

Undesirable

:

123456789
123456789
123456789
123456789
12345678
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Consistent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Predictable

:

:

_:

:

:

:

_:

:

:

Very Helpful

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Fair

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Desirable

9

The following items concern how you feel as you watched the video tape.
Specifically, we want to know how free you felt to make up your o\m
mind about how the participant in the video tape should be rewarded or
punished.
Did you feel that the participant's behavior and the nature
of the experiment made one course of action far more appropriate than
any other? Or, did you feel you were free to try any strategy you
wished on any trial?
To what degree were the rewards and punishments you gave determined by
the answers given by the participant in the video tape?

Completely
Undetermined

123456789
"

:

;

;

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Completely
Determined
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To what degree did you feel that it was
unnecessary to reward the
participant every time he gave an answer you
believed to be correct?

Completely
TT
Unnecessary

:

123456789
:

:

:

*

•

•

•

•

_

,
Completely
„
Necessary

_'

To what degree did you feel that it was
unnecessary to punish the
participant every time he gave an answer you believed
to be incorrect?

Completely
Unnecessary

_
——

Completely
Necessary

To what degree did you feel that rewarding and punishing
every trial
might be a bad strategy when you aren't real sure which answer
is
correct?

Definitely a
Bad Strategy

.

,

,

/

_

^

Definitely a
^ood Strategy

^

To what degree did you feel that you ought to be rewarding or punishing
every trial in order to please the experimenter?

Very
Unimportant
.

123456789
"

'

'

'

*

*

'

*

*

'

Very
Important

How free did you feel to decide, on each particular trial, that the
participant deserved neither reward nor punishment?
Very Unfree

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Free

How free did you feel to decide, on each particular trial, to reward
the participant for an answer you had previously punished?
Very Unfree

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Free

How free did you feel to decide, on each particular trial, to punish
the participant for an answer you previously rewarded?
Very Unfree

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Free

On each particular trial, how free did you feel to change your mind
about which answer should be rewarded and which should be punished?

Very Unfree

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Free
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The following questions concern your freedom to carry out any plan or
intention you may have had.
Once you had decided how you wanted to
reward or punish, how free were you to do what you wanted to do?

How free were you _to give rewards and punishments to the participant
in the video tape when you wanted to do so?
Very Unfree

123456789

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:_

:

Very Free

:

How free were you to. withhold rewards and punishments from the participant in the video tape when you wanted to do so?
Very Unfree

123456789

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Free

:

In general, how free were you to reinforce the participant the way
you wanted to?

Very Unfree

:

:

345

:

1

:

2

:

789

:

:

:

6

:

Very Free

:

How would you describe the way in which you rewarded and punished
the person in the video tape during the reinforcement period, in terms
of percentages?
Rewarded about

% of the trials

Punished about

Z of the trials
% of the trials

Neither rewarded nor punished about

% of the trials

'

Both rewarded and punished about

Although you did not know which was the correct position before, now
that you've seen the film, which position do you now think was the
correct position in the perceptual discrimination experiment?
Certain it was
Position B

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

•

*

Certain it was
Position A

Not
Sure

How much control do you believe you possessed over the conditioned
thumb responses?
No Control

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

'

Total Control
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How much control did you feel you exercised over the amount of money
you gave during the reinforcement session?
No Control

123456789

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

xotal Control

;

How relaxed were you during the reinforcement session?
Very Tense

123456789

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Relaxed

:

Approximately 100 subjects will participate in the experiment as you
have just done.
On the average, how do you think they will reward
and punish the person in the video tape during the reinforcement phase,
in terms of percentages?
They will reward about

7o

They will punish about

% of the trials

of the trials

They will neither reward nor pxinish about

% of the trials

They will both reward and punish about

7o

of the trials

If you had been allowed to give the reinforcements voluntarily rather
than using the conditioned thumb responses as the reinforcements, how
do you think you would have reinforced, in terms of percentages?
(Assume that you would have watched the same person in the same tape.)

Would have rewarded about

% of the trials

Would have punished about

7o

of the trials

Would have neither rewarded nor punished about
trials

7o

Would have both rewarded and punished about

7o

of the

of the trials

The following items concern your Impressions of the kinds of factors
that may have influenced the way you rewarded and/or punished the
participant. How important were each of the following considerations
in influencing your behaviors?

Your belief that one of the positions was correct?
Unimportant

:

123456789
::

:

:

:

:

:

:

•

'

Important
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Your belief that equity and fair play demand that people get what
they deserve.

Unimportant

:

:

34

:

1

:

2

_:

:

:

5

89

:

6

:

7

Important

:

Your control over the conditioned thumb responses.
Unimportant

123456789

:

_:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Important

:

Your estimate of the difficulty of the perceptual discrimination
task.

Unimportant

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Important

:

Your belief that the observer would want you to reward and punish
in a certain way?
Unimportant

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

'

:

:

Important

Your own generosity or stinginess.

Unimportant

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

'

:

Important

Which of the following four alternative causes is the most probable
cause of the way in which you reinforced? Indicate your choice by
circling the letter next to the cause which you think is more probable.
If you choose "d", specify the particular combination of factors that
you think caused your behavior. For example, a and b, or a and c,
or b and c, or a, b, and c.
a.

b.

c.

d.

Something about you probably caused you to make the
responses you made to the video taped experiment.
Something about the person in the video tape and his
performance probably caused you to make the responses you
made to the video taped experiment.
Something about the particular circumstances of the experi
make
ment you are participating in probably caused you to
the responses you made to the video taped experiment.

you
Some combination of the above factors probably caused
experiment.
taped
video
the
to
made
to make the responses you

Specify the combination:
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How a person behaves depends upon a
number of factors. At one extreme
are some behavaors which are a
result of external causes and pressures
(causes outside the person).
At the other extreme are some
beSavJors
which are the result of internal causes
or reasons (causes insidlthe
person
Consider -the reinforcements that you
have just given the
participant xn the video tape, do you
consider that those reinforcements were mainly due to external factors,
mainly due to internal
factors, or reflected some mixture of
internal and external factors''
Ulark your response with a slash (that
is,
on the -Lxut:
/
)
line
'
below.)
.

Mainly due

50% external
50% internal

to external

M^l^ly due
to internal
factors

factors

How much influence do you think your thought
processes had on your
conditioned thumb responses during the reinforcement
phase of the
experiment?
No influence

:

123A56789
:

:

:

:

:

..

:

.

Total influence

.

In terms of percentages, how frequently did your reinforcements
endorse
a particular position (that is, reward when the position was
selected
and punish when the other position was selected)?

Endorsed position A about

'i

of the trials

Endorsed position B about

^%

of the trials

Endorsed neither position A nor B about

"L

of the trials

How hard did you try to reward a correct response and punish an incorrect response?
Didn't Try
At All

Tried Very
Much
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READ THE COMPLETE ITEM BEFORE RECORDING YOUR RESPONSE. DO NOT OMIT
ANY ITEMS. PLEASE NOTE THAT "SUBJECT" REFERS TO THE PERSON IfflO
PARTICIPATED IN THE EXPERIMENT, NOT YOURSELF.
What was the net reinforcement the subject gave to the participant
in the video tape?
(Enter the amount)
^

Approximately ICQ subjects will participate in the experiment as the
subject has just done. What do you think will be the average net
reinforcement to the participant in the video tape?
i

How would you describe or characterize the subject's rewarding and
(Indicate your response with a check mark)
punishing behavior?
Inconsistent

:

Unpredictable

:

Very Unhelpful

:

Very Unfair

:

Undesirable

:

123A56789
123456789
123456789
123456789
123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Consistent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Predictable

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

*.

Very Helpful

:

:

'

•

Very Fair

Desirable

The following items concern how you think the subject felt as he watched
Specifically, we want to know how free you think he
the video tape.
ovm mind about how the participant in the video
his
felt to make up
Did he feel that the participant's
or punished.
rewarded
tape should be
made one course of action far
experiment
the
of
behavior and the nature
he feel he was free to try
did
Or,
other?
more appropriate than any
trial?
any strategy he wished on any
gave
To what degree were the rewards and punishments the subject
tape?
video
the
in
participant
determined by the answers given by the

Completely
Undetermined

*— *—

:

:

'~r'"r'~r'"r'"r

"T

Completely
^^^^^^""^^
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To what degree did the subject feel that it was unnecessary to reward
the participant every time he gave an answer which the subject believed
to be correct?

Completely
Unnecessary
^

.....
—
—— — —
123456789
'-t

'•

*

:

•

'

*

*

'

'

Completely
*

Ni^(-p<;t;flrv
r^ecessary

To what degree did the subject feel that it was unnecessary to punish
the participant every time he gave an answer he believed to be

incorrect?

Completely
Unnecessary

Completely
Necessary

*"y"'~2~'~'~4~'~^ *~5~*~7~

To what degree did the subject feel that rewarding and punishing every
trial might be a bad strategy when he isn't real sure which answer
is correct?

Definitely a
Bad Strategy

Definitely a
Good Strategy

*"Y"*~Y""~J"'"y~*"3~*~6"'"y"

To what degree did the subject feel that he ought to be rewarding or
punishing every trial in order to please the experimenter?

Very
Unimportant

Very
Important

'~X~"~2~~*~~3~*"~A~'~5~~'~6~''~7~*~"8~'~9~*

How free did the subject feel to decide, on each particular trial, that
the participant deserved neither reward nor punishment?
Very Unfree

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

*•

Very Free

How free did the subject feel to decide, on each particular trial, to
reward the participant for an answer he had previously punished?
Very Unfree

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Free

How free did the subject feel to decide, on each particular trial, to
punish the participant for an answer he previously rewarded?
Very Unfree

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

'

'

'

Very Free
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On each particular trial, how free did the subject feel to change his
mind about which answer should be rewarded and which should be punished?

Very Unfree

12 345

:

:

:

:

:

:

:
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:

6

Very Free

:

:

7

The following questions concern the subject's freedom to carry out
any plan or j.ntention he may have had.
Once he had decided how he
wanted to reward or punish, how free was he to do what he wanted to
do?

How free was the subject _to give rewards and punishments to the participant in the video tape when he wanted to do so?
Very Unfree

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Free

:

How free was the subject _to withhold rewards and punishments from the
participant in the video tape when he wanted to do so?
Very Unfree

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Free

:

In general, how free was the subject to reinforce the participant the
he wanted to?

V7ay

Very Unfree

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Free

:

How would you describe the way invhich the subject rewarded and punished the person in the video tape during the reinforcement period,
in terms of percentages?
Rewarded about

% of the trials

Punished about

% of the trials
% of the trials

Neither rewarded nor punished about
Both rewarded and punished about

of the trials

7o

Although the subject did not know which was the correct position before,
now that he has seen the film, which position does he think was the
correct position in the perceptual discrimination experiment?
Certain it was
Position B

-•

Not
Sure

•

•

•

*

*

Certain it was
Position A
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How much control do you think the subject believed he possessed over
the conditioned thumb responses?
No Control

:

:

:

2

•1

34
:

:

:

:

89

:

6

5

:

7

:

Total Control

How much control did the subject feel he exercised over the amount of
money he gave during the reinforcement session?
No Control

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Total Control

How relaxed was the subject during the reinforcement session?
Very Tense

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Very Relaxed

Approximately 100 subjects will participate in the experiment as the
subject has just done. On the average, how do you think they will
reward and punish the person in the video tape during the reinforcement phase, in terms of percentages?
They will reward about

% of the trials

They will punish about

7o

of the trials

They will neither reward nor punish about

7o

of the trials

% of the trials

They will both reward and punish about

If the subject had been allowed to give reinforcements voluntarily
rather than using the conditioned thumb responses as the reinforcements,
how do you think he would have reinforced, in terms of percentages?
(Assume that he would have watched the same person in the same tape.)

Would have rewarded about

% of the trials

Would have punished about

of the trials

Would have neither rewarded nor punished about
the trials
Would have both rewarded and punished about
trials

'i

of

% of the

The following items concern your impressions of the kinds of factors
punished
that may have influenced the way the subject rewarded and/or
considerafollowing
How important were each of the
the participant.
tions in influencing his behavior?

94

His belief that one of the positions was correct?

Unimportant

123456789

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Important

:

His belief that equity and fair play demand that people get what
they deserve.

Unimportant

123456789

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Important

:

His control over the conditioned thumb responses.

Unimportant

123456789

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Important

:

His estimate of the difficulty of the perceptual discrimination
task.

Unimportant

123456789

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Important

'

His -belief that you would want him to reward and punish in a
certain way.

Unimportant

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

•

•

Important

His own generosity and stinginess.

Unimportant

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

=

:

•

•

Important

Which of the following four alternative causes is the most probable
choice
cause of the way in which the subject reinforced? Indicate your
most
is
by circling the letter next to the cause which you think
of
If you choose "d", specify the particular combination
probable.
or
b,
For example, a and
factors that you think caused his behavior.
a and c, or b and c, or a, b, and c.
a.

b.

c.

Something about the subject probably caused him to make
the responses he made to the video taped experiment.
perSomething about the person in the vi deo tape and his
made
he
responses
the
make
formance probably caused him to
to the video taped experiment.
of the experiSomething about the particuJ ar circumstances
to make
him
caused
ment he is participating in probably
experiment.
the responses he made to the video taped
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d.

Some combination of the above factors probably caused him
to make the responses he made to the video taped experiment.

Specify the combination:

How a person behaves depends upon a number of factors. At one extreme
are some behaviors v^hich are a result of external causes and pressures
At the other extreme are some behaviors
(causes outside the person)
which are the result of internal causes or reasons (causes inside
Consider the reinforcements that the subject just gave
the person).
to the participant in the video tape, do you consider that those reinforcements were mainly due to external factors, mainly due to internal
factors, or reflected some mixture of internal and external factors?
I
) on the line
(Mark your response with a slash, (that is,
.

below.

Mainly due
to internal
factors

50% external
50% internal

Mainly due
to external
factors

How much influence do you think the subject's thought processes had
on his conditioned thumb responses during the reinforcement phase of
the experiment?
No Influence

:

123456789
:

:

:

:

:

'

•

'

•

Total Influence

reinforceIn terras of percentages, how frequently did the subject's
the position
when
reward
is,
(that
position
ments endorse a particular
selected)?
was
position
other
the
was selected and punish when

Endorsed position A about
Endorsed position B about

7o

of the trials

% of the trials

Endorsed neither position A nor B about

7"

of the trials

response and punish
How hard did the subject try to reward a correct
an incorrect response?

Didn't Try
At All

Tried Very
Much

